

**Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

24 April 2003

Original: English

Second session

Geneva, 28 April-9 May 2003

**Implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the
1995 decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament"**

Report submitted by the Republic of Korea


As stated in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in the section entitled, "Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12", in paragraph 15, subparagraph 12, the Conference agreed upon the submission of "Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament'". In this regard, the Republic of Korea hereby submits its report to the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT.

1. The NPT remains the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Under the current circumstances, in which non-compliance with the NPT and its safeguards systems has undermined the integrity and credibility of the Treaty, and in light of the growing threat of nuclear terrorism in the wake of the September 11 attacks, the need to fortify and preserve the efficacy and integrity of the Treaty has become more crucial than ever.

2. As a non-nuclear weapon State, the Republic of Korea continues to abide by its commitment, pursuant to the Treaty, not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

3. The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference marked a significant achievement in the field of nuclear disarmament. The guidelines laid out in the Document, particularly the 13 practical steps therein, serve not only as a measuring stick to gauge progress in this field, but also as a roadmap towards achieving the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament.

Since the adoption of the NPT Final Document in 2000, expectations have been ever-increasing for progress in the implementation of disarmament and



transparency measures on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. The five nuclear-weapon States should put their unequivocal commitment to disarmament into action by making systematic and progressive efforts. However, it should also be recognized that nuclear disarmament is a dynamic and complex process that is inextricably connected to the international security environment. Therefore, a gradual step-by-step approach would be a realistic and pragmatic method with which to proceed.

4. The Republic of Korea attaches great importance to the achievement of an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The ROK signed the CTBT on 24 September 1996 when it opened for signature and deposited its instrument of ratification on 24 September 1999. The ROK continues to encourage other States to ratify this Treaty, particularly those States whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force at the earliest possible date. In an effort to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty, the ROK has served as a friend of the Chair for the facilitation of the Treaty's early entry into force. Moreover the Foreign Minister of the ROK participated in the Article XIV conference held in New York in September 2002.

It is our firm belief that existing moratoria on nuclear testing by all countries must be maintained, while sustained support is being accorded to the early establishment of the effective monitoring mechanism of the CTBTO. In this regard, the ROK is actively participating in the development of the CTBT's international monitoring system (IMS), particularly through the cooperation of its seismological monitoring station, one of the primary stations in the North-East Asian region.

5. The ROK attaches great importance to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the single multilateral forum for negotiating disarmament agreements. It is regrettable that the CD has yet been unable to break the impasse that has kept it from beginning its substantive work. As a facilitator for the agenda review during the 2002 session, the ROK has actively cooperated with other CD members to contribute to the revitalization of the CD.

As a next logical step towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, it is imperative for the CD to immediately begin negotiations on a universal and verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT).

6. The ROK fully supports the essential role of the IAEA as a competent authority responsible for the verification and assurance of compliance with NPT obligations. The ROK continues to urge those States which have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA to do so. To strengthen the Agency's effectiveness in verifying compliance and detecting actions of non-compliance, it is important to promote the universality of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. For its part, the ROK is currently advancing with the internal procedure for the ratification of the Protocol.

7. The ROK welcomes progress on the development and implementation of nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements. At the fifty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, the ROK lent its support to resolutions establishing or consolidating nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Furthermore, the ROK continues to uphold its commitments to the Joint South-North Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula adopted in 1992.

8. The ROK welcomes the Strategic Offense Reductions Treaty concluded by the United States and the Russian Federation in May 2002. The ROK also welcomes the ratification of the Treaty by the U.S. Senate in March 2003. It is expected that such progress in bilateral nuclear reductions agreements will facilitate similar disarmament initiatives in the future.

9. The ROK recognizes that strengthening relevant export control regimes provides a useful tool for the effective prevention of nuclear proliferation. These mechanisms should continue to be strengthened.

From 1 January 2003, the ROK Government introduced the catch-all system into its legal framework and is implementing it accordingly.

10. In December 2002, the ROK hosted a conference on disarmament and non-proliferation in cooperation with the United Nations Regional Disarmament Centre for Asia and the Pacific, which addressed, inter alia, the issue of nuclear non-proliferation within changing international dynamics.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review
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**Report by the Kingdom of Morocco on the implementation
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
and the 1995 resolution on the Middle East**

**I. Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and of paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision
on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament**


1. The Kingdom of Morocco remains committed to general and complete disarmament and in particular to nuclear disarmament. Since its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1970, it has constantly worked for the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their non-proliferation. Morocco believes that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and a key instrument for the maintenance of peace and security in the world. It has therefore always supported initiatives aimed at strengthening the authority of this regime and promoting its universality.

2. In implementation of the Treaty, Morocco concluded a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as of 1975 and has undertaken the domestic procedure for signing an additional protocol.

3. At the level of the General Assembly, Morocco has always supported the adoption of resolutions for the promotion of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

4. As a Contracting Party, the Kingdom of Morocco has consistently supported the decisions aimed at strengthening the review process of the Treaty.

5. The new international security situation resulting from the events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated the enormous importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the need to preserve its strength and credibility in order to confront the threats associated with nuclear terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Morocco believes that the strengthening of the multilateral regime of the Non-Proliferation Treaty remains a necessary measure to combat the



illicit proliferation of nuclear devices and materials and their possession by terrorists.

6. Morocco has ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.

7. Morocco stresses the crucial importance of respect by all States Parties for the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the obligations arising from it.

8. Morocco, which supports a total ban on nuclear tests, has signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It deplores the fact that this Treaty, which was opened for signature on 24 September 1996, has still not entered into force. In this respect, it reiterates its appeal to all States which have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty without delay. It stresses the importance of respect for the moratoriums on nuclear tests and of the convening of conferences in order to facilitate the entry into force of the Treaty.

9. Morocco reaffirms the inalienable right of the States Parties to the Treaty to carry out research and develop the production and utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, particularly through international cooperation under IAEA monitoring.

10. Morocco endorses action to overcome obstacles in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, and continues to support the undertaking of negotiations for the formulation of a treaty on fissile material, a legal instrument on negative security assurances and a convention on nuclear disarmament.

11. Morocco fully supports the positive conclusions of the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 2000, and reaffirms the importance of their implementation by the States Parties, in a transparent and irreversible manner.

II. Implementation of the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

1. The Kingdom of Morocco remains convinced that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. For that reason, it has always supported the establishment of such zones where they did not exist.

2. Morocco was one of the first countries to call for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, because it believes that the existence of such a zone is not only a necessary measure to banish proliferation and insecurity in this region, but also an international objective and a factor in the consolidation of peace and security in the world.

3. At the level of the League of Arab States, Morocco is participating in the development of a legal and technical mechanism for the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

4. Within IAEA, Morocco is engaged in promoting the application of the safeguards regime throughout the Middle East region, because it believes that this is an international security measure which should affect all States of the world.

5. Morocco encourages the conclusion by all States of the Middle East region, including Israel, of comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA, as an important step towards the creation of a climate of trust between the States of the region, and a preliminary measure for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

6. Morocco has helped promote confidence-building measures between the States parties to the conflict in the Middle East, particularly by participating in the work of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security.

7. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East requires that the only State of the region — Israel — which is not yet a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should accede to it and submit its nuclear installations to the IAEA safeguards regime. This concern was specifically mentioned in the decisions of the review conferences of the Non-Proliferation Treaty held in 1995 and 2000.

8. Morocco stresses the need for all the parties concerned to take concrete measures, as a matter of urgency, for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region, and pending the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly their intention to refrain, on the basis of reciprocity, from manufacturing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and not to allow the emplacement of nuclear weapons in their territories by any third party.

9. Morocco believes that appropriate security measures should be established for nuclear installations.

10. The Kingdom of Morocco is conducting sustained action, at both regional and international levels, to encourage all the States of the region to undertake the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

11. The Kingdom of Morocco constantly reiterates its appeal to the nuclear Powers, and particularly to the depositaries of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to the international community and to international organizations to rise to their responsibilities for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
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**Measures undertaken by the Republic of Croatia on
implementing the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

Report submitted by Croatia

1. In accordance with the recommendations of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and taking into consideration paragraph 15, subparagraph 12, and paragraph 16, subparagraph 7, of the said document, the Republic of Croatia would like, through the United Nations Secretariat, to inform the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee and the President of the 2005 Review Conference on progress it has made on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament".
2. Having passed the test of time, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has confirmed its role as the most important international deterrence instrument against the threat of nuclear arms proliferation, while conversely promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is our firm belief that the Treaty has helped to facilitate and promote the enhancement of regional as well as global strategic security and stability.
3. In accordance with its internationally accepted obligations, the Republic of Croatia is actively implementing and abiding by the principles of non-proliferation and the non-acquisition of nuclear materials or equipment used in the production of nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices. In this regard, Croatia believes that in order to strengthen international acceptance of these provisions the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should, at its earliest possible opportunity, establish an ad hoc committee with a mandate to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
4. That being said, Croatia should like also to add its support to the stipulation included in article VI of the Treaty, which contains a clear obligation for States parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and nuclear disarmament, and on



a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Croatia therefore supports efforts within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament to establish, at its earliest possible opportunity, an ad hoc committee with a mandate to exchange information and views on practical steps towards concluding a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable instrument on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

5. Croatia signed an Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the Application of Safeguards (National Gazette 13/1994) in 1994. In doing so, Croatia accepted the safeguards system of IAEA with the aim of preventing the misuse of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy so as not to acquire nuclear weapons or other materials required for nuclear explosions. Supervision and control measures are implemented for all nuclear materials (source or special fissionable material), whether it is being produced, processed or used in any nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. Even though Croatia at this time does not possess any nuclear facilities, it is important to note that all the necessary safeguard measures are applied (supervision and control measures) in all peaceful activities involving nuclear materials on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, territory under its jurisdiction or under its control.

6. Croatia signed an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (National Gazette 7/2000). In doing so, Croatia accepted the obligation to establish supervision and control measures in the production and import and export of specific equipment and materials specially designed or prepared for producing, processing or using nuclear materials. The scope of the Protocol in regard to the supervision and control of production activities is outlined in annex I, and a list of equipment and materials under export or import control is included in annex II to the Additional Protocol.

7. In line with articles 2 and 3 of the Additional Protocol, Croatia regularly reports to IAEA on the current state of affairs in Croatia with regard to the use of nuclear materials, research and development activities, as well as the production, import and export of specific equipment and nuclear materials. Regular inspections are conducted at locations where nuclear materials are used or where specific equipment can be produced. At the State level all uses of nuclear materials are lodged in an official register, which is kept at the Directorate for Energy and Mining of the Ministry of Economy. The import and export of nuclear materials, specific equipment and non-nuclear materials is supervised/regulated through the issuance of licences by the Directorate for Trade Policy and International Economic Relations of the Ministry of Economy, but only after receiving prior clearance from the Directorate for Energy and Mining.

8. Croatia is also a State party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (National Gazette 5/2001). In becoming a State party to that Convention, Croatia undertook the obligation to effectively protect nuclear materials that are used, stored (stockpiled) or transported for peaceful purposes. Croatia will not approve the import, export or transit (transport) of nuclear materials without guarantees that these materials are protected according to levels specified in annex I of the Convention. In the event of theft, robbery or any other illegal activity involving nuclear materials or similar threats, Croatia shall, in line with its domestic

legislation, undertake to cooperate and provide assistance in efforts to retrieve and protect those materials.

9. International obligations undertaken by Croatia in regard to protection measures and the supervision or control of nuclear materials are regulated by domestic legislation. This includes:

(a) Act on Protection from Ionizing Radiation and Safety Measures for Nuclear Plants and Facilities of Croatia (*Zakon o mjerama za zaštitu od ionizirajućeg zračenja i za sigurnost nuklearnih objekata i postrojenja*, NN 18/1981);

(b) Act on Radiation Protection and the Safe Use of Nuclear Energy (*Zakon o zaštiti od ionizirajućih zračenja i o posebnim mjerama sigurnosti pri upotrebi nuklearne energije*, NN 53/1991);

(c) Act on Liability for Nuclear Damage (*Zakon o odgovornosti za nuklearnu štetu*, NN 143/1998);

(d) Law on Trade (*Zakon o trgovini*, NN 11/1996; 75/1999; 76/1999; 62/2001; 109/2001);

(e) Act on the Transport of Dangerous Materials (*Zakon o prijevozu opasnih tvari*, NN 97/1993);

(f) Law of Customs Tariffs (*Zakon o carinskoj tarifi*, NN 61/2000);

(g) Decree on the Specification of Goods on the Basis of Import/Export Licensing (*Uredba o određivanju robe koja se izvozi i uvozi na temelju dozvola*, NN 118/2001, 108/2002, 134/2002).

10. Moreover, Croatia is also a State party to the following Conventions regulating the peaceful uses of nuclear energy:

- Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (IAEA document INFCIRC/500/Add.1);
- Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (INFCIRC/335);
- Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (INFCIRC/336);
- Joint Protocol relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention (INFCIRC/402);
- Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (INFCIRC/546).

11. Croatia is a State party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Croatia signed the Treaty on 24 September 1996 and ratified it on 2 March 2001) and actively participates in the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, including its Working Group B which deals with the examination of verification issues. Croatia established in June 2002 a National Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, which consists of representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Economy, the Geophysical Institute of the Mathematical Faculty of the University of Zagreb, the Naval Institute, the Croatian Institute for Construction

and the Ruder Bošković Institute. Croatia has designated the Department for International Security of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as its national authority acting as focal point for liaison with the Preparatory Commission and with other States signatories. Croatia participated in the workshops of the Preparatory Commission in Vienna (November 1998) and in Istanbul (May 2001).

12. In connection with the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, Croatia has either individually or collectively already expressed its favourable attitude towards the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, recognizing them as important complementary instruments to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Appreciating the role that nuclear-weapon-free zones can play in promoting regional and global peace and security, Croatia welcomes the treaties hitherto concluded in this respect: the Treaty of Tlatelolco on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty of Pelindaba on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.

13. At the same time, Croatia continues to believe that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones must not interfere with existing — or evolving — security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security, or otherwise adversely affect the inalienable right to individual or collective self-defence guaranteed under the Charter of the United Nations. It is therefore the firm belief of Croatia that internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones can be established only on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned.

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
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**Implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the
1995 decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament"**

Report submitted by Slovakia

1. Following the agreement in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference on "regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", Slovakia wishes to report the following.
2. In spite of the fact that Slovakia is not a nuclear-weapon State, it is a long-standing policy to support and to participate in activities relevant to non-proliferation and the eradication of all types of weapons of mass destruction. In 1993, as one of the successor States of the former Czechoslovakia, Slovakia assumed all relevant international commitments in this field.
3. Slovakia welcomes the agreements between the United States of America and the Russian Federation considerably reducing their nuclear arsenals and believes that the agreements point to the creation of a new strategic framework and an improved bilateral relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation for the twenty-first century.
4. Slovakia is aware of the essential role of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in strengthening global peace and security. In a changing world security environment, the early entry into force of the Treaty is even more urgent and important today. Therefore Slovakia calls upon all States, especially those on the list of 44 States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, to do so without any delay. Slovakia aligned itself with the Joint Ministerial Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty adopted on 14 September 2002 at United Nations Headquarters calling for the early ratification of the Treaty by all relevant States. Slovakia ratified the Treaty in March 1998 and fully observes its obligations arising from the Treaty. In September/October 2001, Slovakia hosted the second on-site inspection field experiment and equipment test. Slovakia has designated the



Slovak Nuclear Regulatory Authority as its national authority and thus established a focal point for liaison with other State signatories.

5. Slovakia regrets that the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to commence negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, which would be an important multilateral step in strengthening nuclear non-proliferation as well as nuclear disarmament. In this connection, Slovakia supports the establishment of a subsidiary body within the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty.

6. Slovakia fully endorses the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons and supports the strengthened revision process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Accordingly, Slovakia stands ready to participate actively in the preparation of the 2005 Review Conference.

7. All nuclear facilities as well as nuclear material in the Slovak territory are subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full-scope safeguards. In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic performs inspections of small users in accordance with the provisions of the so-called Atomic Act. In September 1999, Slovakia signed the new Full Scope Safeguards Agreement with IAEA and the Additional Protocol to the new Agreement. Slovakia also vigorously supports the International Atomic Energy Agency's programme for strengthening the effectiveness and improvement of the efficiency of safeguards to further enhance the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear materials and clandestine activities.

8. Nuclear export control is an important element of the implementation of article III, paragraph 2, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Slovakia fully implements and applies the Understanding of the Zangger Committee and the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to exports of nuclear-related material and technologies.

9. Slovakia cooperates broadly with a number of international organizations and with more than 25 countries on a bilateral basis in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Slovakia also participates in regular consultations of the European Union with the associated countries on wide range of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament issues.

10. Slovakia believes that reporting as such will increase transparency and confidence within the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and despite differences in views with regard to the scope and the format of reporting, Slovakia is convinced that all parties to the Treaty are united in their will to make the process of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament continuous and irreversible.